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RECENT DECISIONS
The Natural Right of Disposition
by Will
In Campbell v. Musart Society of the
Cleveland Museum of Art' the Probate Court
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, said in its dicta,
that the right to make a disposition of prop-
erty by will is neither a natural, nor in the
United States, a constitutional right.
In general, the overwhelming authority in
the United States is that the right to dispose
of property by will is purely statutory, sub-
ject to the complete control of the legisla-
ture.
2
In the days of undeveloped society, fam-
ily ownership preceded individual owner-
ship and although the father was lord of the
family, he held all possessions as trustee for
his children. Upon his death all possessions
would be the family's by universal succes-
sion.3 Until the time of the Romans, there
is very little mention of wills in history al-
though there are some traces in older civil-
izations. For example, in 2548 B.C. an
Egyptian executed an instrument, on papy-
rus, witnessed by two scribes, giving certain
property to his wife and appointing a guard-
ian for his infant children. 4 The Assyrian
monarch, Sennacherib, who died in 681
B.C., left an instrument bequeathing to his
son a vast treasure.5 However, the ancient
code of Hammurabi made no mention of
wills and although a son might be disin-
herited for good cause, this had to be done
1 131 N.E. 2d 279 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1956).
2 1 PAGE, WILLS §25 (3d ed. 1941).
3 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 183, 184 (7th ed. 1878).
4 ATKINSON, WILLS §2 (2d ed. 1953).
5Ibid.
in a proceeding before a judge, which was
apparently held in the lifetime of the father.6
According to Tacitus the will was unknown
to the Germans in the second Century A.D.,7
and it was also unknown among the Greeks
until the time of Solon.8
Even in Rome, which is usually credited
with the true power of testation, we find no
express recognition of testamentary power
until the time of the Twelve Tables.9 These
ancient testaments or wills of Rome were
actually the mode of declaring who was to
succeed to the chieftainship of the family
held by the testator and the material prop-
erty was not mentioned at all or only as an
adjunct or appendage of the family. 10
While the right to transfer property to
descendants by inheritance was recognized
in early times, the idea of disposing of one's
property by will as we know it today did not
exist.
The first Roman testaments were exe-
cuted in the parliament of the patricians of
Rome. Under the caste organization of
Rome, members of the same gens had cer-
tain rights in the estates of families belong-
ing to it. The gens was composed of two
classes of families: the agnati who descended
from a common ancestor in the male line;
and the gentiles which were members bear-
ing the same name. Members of the two
classes of families that composed the gens
assembled in the parliament to which the
testaments were submitted. Here it was de-
6 1 PAGE, WILLS §10 (3d ed. 1941).
7 lid. § 12.
8 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES *502.
0 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 190 (7th ed. 1878).
10 Id. at 191.
cided who was to succeed to the estates of
the families, for on default of the agnati, the
gentiles would succeed.
However, the Roman will that has had
such a wide influence on other nations was
not the one executed in the parliament, but
rather an inter vivos conveyance known as
the Plebeian Will.
The Plebeian Will was derived from a pro-
cedure used in Roman conveyance, called
the nancipatio, a sale between the vendor
and vendee. For this transaction there were
required five witnesses and the libripens who
held the scales upon which the uncoined
copper of ancient Rome was weighed."
The Plebeian Will or testament per aes et
libram (with the copper and scales) was a
mancipatio in which the testator was the
vendor, and the appointed heir or purchaser
of the family (emptor Jamiliae) was the
vendee, the family being the object of the
sale.' 2 However, it was a fictitious sale, for
the vendee only pretended to pay a price by
striking the scales with a piece of money. 13
Among the characteristics of the Plebeian
Will were: (1) a publication of the sale; 14
(2) irrevocability; 5 and (3) suspension of
effectiveness until the testator's death.' 6
The Pretorian Will, later used contem-
poraneously with the Plebeian Will, was a
form of the Plebeian Will which although re-
quiring witnesses, seals and a written docu-
ment lacked some of the formalities of the
Plebeian Will.' 7 It contained only those ele-
ments that were necessary to guarantee
against fraud.
However, in the days of Gaius, the emptor
11 HANNAN, CANON LAW OF WILLS 21 (1935).
12 Id. at 22.
13 Id. at 21, 22.
14 Id. at 22.
'5 Id. at 21.
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 22, 23.
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familiae did not have to be the beneficiary
of the will, and the heir could be someone
who had to surrender the familia to some-
one else after the testator's death.' 8 It was
at this time that the will became secret and
revocable. 19
The will as we know it today, though it
was derived from the old Roman will, is far
from being what it stood for in ancient times.
The early Roman wills which were inter
vivos conveyances did not represent the
means of arranging for the transfer of one's
property after death.
The only jurisdiction in the United States
maintaining that the right to dispose of prop-
erty by will is an inherent one is Wisconsin .20
The basis for this contention is found in the
case of Nunnemacher v. State.21 Actually,
the question before the court was the right
to take by inheritance but the court also ex-
pounded the idea of the right of an individ-
ual to dispose of property by will.
In the Nunnemacher case, the court rea-
soned that the government is the creature of
the people, who in full possession of liberty
and property came together and united to
protect themselves, their liberty, and their
property. How then, it argued, could the
government, which is the agency of the peo-
ple, create property rights and confer them
upon its creators, who had them before it
existed? Yet, the court did not deny that
governments, from earliest times, regulated
the exercise of these rights by positive law.
The court also claimed that the idea, that
the government has the right to create and
destroy property rights, has probably de-
18 Id. at 24.
V) Ibid.
20 In re Rice's Will, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956
(1912); Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190,
108 N.W. 627 (1906) (dictum).
21 Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W.
627, 629, 630 (1906) (dictum).
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veloped from failure to keep in mind the
radical difference between our republican
theory of the origin of goyernment (i.e., man
is the source of all rights, and united and
formed governments to protect them) and
the medieval idea that government was sent
down from above, with consequent rights
and privileges flowing in gracious streams to
the people, who otherwise would not possess
them.
The court admitted that the existence of
the right to dispose of property by will in the
earliest times is not easy of proof but stated
that nevertheless it seemed there could be
no doubt of the fact. To uphold this state-
ment it quotes Schouler on Wills to the effect
that history:
... confirms the opinion that the practice
of allowing the owner of property to direct
its destination after his death, or at least of
imposing general rules of inheritance, is
coeval with civilization itself, and so close,
in fact, upon the origin of property and
property rights as not to be essentially sepa-
rated in point of antiquity. 22
However, the right to transmit property
by inheritance is to be distinguished from
the right to dispose by will, for while proof
is lacking in regard to the natural right to
transmit property by will, there seems to be
a natural right to transmit property by in-
heritance.
The right to transmit property by descent,
to one's own offspring, is dictated by the
voice of nature. The universality of the sense
of a rule of obligation, is pretty good evi-
dence that it has its foundation in natural
law. It is in accordance with the sympathies
and reason of all mankind, that the children
of the owner of property which he acquired
and improved by his skill and industry, and
by their association and labor, should have a
22 SCHOULER, WILLS 13 (2d ed.), as quoted in
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W.
627, 629 (1906).
better title to it at his death than the passing
stranger. It is a continuation of the former
occupancy in the members of the same fam-
ily. This better title of the children has been
recognized in every age and nation, and it is
founded in the natural affections, which are
the growth of the domestic ties, and the
order of Providence.23
It should also be noted, that the Athenian
Commonwealth was introduced to the testa-
ment by Solon only in the case in which the
testator had no issue,2 4 and in Roman law a
man was not allowed to disinherit his own
issue without assigning a just cause in his
will.25
Considering the problem, Pope Leo XIII
in Rerum Novarum says:
For it is a most sacred law of nature that
a father must provide food and all neces-
saries for those whom he has begotten; and,
similarly, nature dictates that a man's chil-
dren, who carry on, as it were, and continue
his own personality, should be provided by
him with all that is needful to enable them
honorably to keep themselves from want
and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal
life. Now, in no other way can a father effect
this except by the ownership of profitable
property, which he can transmit to his chil-
dren by inheritance.2 6
The encyclical speaks only of the right to
transmit by inheritance, not of the right to
have a will enforced. This right to transmit
by inheritance is based upon the right of
beneficiaries (that is, the widow and children
of the deceased) to be provided for after the
death of the head of the household. In other
words, this right of the decedent to dispose
of his property does not arise of itself but is
contingent upon the natural right of the heirs
to inherit.2 7
23 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES *326.
24 Id. at *327.
25 Ibid.
26 TREACY, FIVE GREAT ENCYCLICALS 6 (1939).
27 HANNAN, CANON LAW OF WILLS 5 (1935).
The constitutionality of statutes imposing
a tax on successions to estates is usually the
question directly involved in the decisions
which have declared that the right to take
property by inheritance or devise is not a
natural right. Probably the earliest case
dealing with the problem was Mager v.
Grima in which the United States Supreme
Court remarked:
Now the law in question is nothing more
than an exercise of the power which every
State and sovereignty possesses, of regulat-
ing the manner and term within which prop-
erty real and personal within its dominion
may be transmitted by last will and testa-
ment, or by inheritance; and of prescribing
who shall and who shall not be capable of
taking it.2s
In United States v. Fox, it was stated that
the power of the state to regulate the tenure
of real property within her limits, and the
modes of its acquisition and transfer, and
the rules of its descent, and the extent to
which a testamentary disposition of it may
be exercised by its owners, is undoubted.29
Again, in United States v. Perkins, a case
discussing whether personal property be-
queathed to the United States was subject to
an inheritance tax of New York State, the
Court stated:
Though the general consent of the most
enlightened nations has, from the earliest
historical period, recognized a natural right
in children to inherit the property of their
parents, we know of no legal principle to
prevent the legislature from taking away or
limiting the right of testamentary disposition
or imposing such conditions upon its exer-
cise as it may deem conducive to public
good.30
28 Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 667, 668
(1849).
29 United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876).
30 United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 628
(1896).
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Although these opinions have been cited
as authority for the proposition that there
is no natural right to inherit property and
are the basis of other like decisions, a
close analysis of the language in these cases
would seem to indicate that the Court was
not denying the natural right to inherit but
rather was talking about the power of the
legislature to regulate it.
A recent New York case, Estate of Aug-
ustus Van Home Stuyvesant, Jr.,31 consid-
ered the question of the natural right to have
a will enforced. In that case, the testator left
the bulk of his fortune to St. Luke's Hospital
with the direction that the hospital use the
money to erect a memorial pavilion in mem-
ory of his parents. In the same will there was
also a clause directing that certain family
portraits and other miniatures be destroyed
upon the testator's death. However, St.
Luke's Hospital wanted one of the portraits
for its Memorial Pavilion and the New York
Historical Society wanted the other por-
traits and miniatures preserved since they
are associated with New York's early annals.
When the Surrogate's Court was origin-
ally petitioned to prevent the destruction of
these items the court ruled that the mandate
of the will must be obeyed. 32 However, upon
reargument, counsel for the executor of the
estate petitioned that the portraits and mini-
atures be turned over to St. Luke's Hospital
as part of the residuary estate, stating that,
since the decedent did not have the right or
the power to direct the wanton destruction
of any of the assets of his estate, the direction
in the will to destroy the family portraits and
miniatures was invalid and should be dis-
regarded. In support of his position he cited
31 136 N.Y.L.J. No. 123, p. 6, col. 7 (Surr. Ct.
Dec. 28, 1956).
32 Id. at No. 112, p. 8, col. 6 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 12,
1956).
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the New York Court of Appeals as follows:
The right to make a testamentary disposi-
tion of property is not an inherent right; nor
is it a right guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Its exercise to any extent depends en-
tirely upon the consent of the legislature as
expressed in their enactments.33
The petitioner noted that the legislature
has expressed its consent to the testamentary
disposition of personal property in Section
15 of the New York Decedent Estate Law
which reads as follows:
§ 15. Who may make wills of personal
estate. Every person of the age of eighteen
years or upwards, of sound mind and mem-
ory, and no others, may give and bequeath
his or her personal estate, by will in writing.
It was argued that the right to make a
testamentary disposition in New York is
therefore limited to a gift or a bequest. Since
the provision in the decedent's will directing
the destruction of the family portraits and
miniatures is neither a gift nor a bequest,
counsel requested that this clause be de-
clared invalid.
The court did not specifically declare in-
valid the. provision in the will directing the
portraits to be destroyed. It did, however,
direct the portrait of the decedent's father
to be delivered to St. Luke's Hospital and
ordered the remainder of the items to be
given to the New York Historical Society.
By not enforcing the provision in the will
the court in effect held it to be invalid and,
it would seem, reaffirmed the rule that there
is no natural right to have a will enforced
but rather that the right of enforcement lies
solely within the regulation of the state.
33 Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N.Y. 309, 316, 99 N.E.
714, 717 (1912); see also Rubin v. Irving Trust
Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E. 2d 424 (1953).
International Travel as a
Natural Right
In Shachtman v. Dulles1 the United States
District Court, on reviewing the denial
of a passport by the Secretary of State
for the sole reason that the name of an or-
ganization of which the applicant was chair-
man appeared on the Attorney General's
subversive list, held that since the right to
travel is a natural right and as such comes
under the right to "liberty" protected by the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, it is
subject only to the rights of others and rea-
sonable regulation under law. The reason
for denial given by the Secretary, being arbi-
trary, did not constitute reasonable regula-
tion and due process.
The importance of the question of wheth-
er international travel is a right or a privilege
is of recent origin.2 There was little discus-
sion of the subject in the law of the early
years of the United States because there
were no restrictions on the freedom to enter
and leave the country, and a passport was a
document "purporting only to be a request
that the bearer of it may pass safely and
freely ... by which the bearer is recognized
in foreign countries, as an American Citi-
zen."
3
The fact now is that it is impossible to
leave this country without a passport4 and
that even if a person were able to leave the
country without that document, it would be
impossible for him to enter a great many
foreign countries without it.5
1225 F. 2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2 "Passport Denied," State Department Practice
and Due Process, 3 STAN. L. REv. 314 (1950-51).
3 Urtetiqui v. Darcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699
(1835).
4 Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 6 FED. REG.
5821 (1941).
5 Comment, 61 YALE L. J. 171 (1952).
Thus, the question of the right to travel
is today inter-related with the right to be
granted a passport, and the "discretion"
allowed by Executive Order to the Secretary
of State in granting or denying passport ap-
plications6 is subject to the limitations of the
Constitution so that a person may not be
denied a passport without sufficient reason
and due process of the law.7
Traditionally, the freedom to travel
abroad seems to have been considered a
right, and was clearly recognized by the
early common law of England. As early as
1215, the Magna Carta made it lawful "for
anyone ... to leave our kingdom and to
return safe and secure by land and water.
..,,s Blackstone later said that the common
law allowed men to go abroad for whatever
reason they wished. 9
In the United States, the right to travel
between the states was recognized in 1867
in Crandall v. Nevada where the Court said
that this right is in its nature independent of
the will of any state over whose soil a man
must pass in the exercise of it.10 In A llgeyer
v. Louisiana the Court, in construing the
word "liberty" in the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, said:
The Liberty mentioned in that amend-
ment means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from mere physical restraint of
his person ... but ... the right of the citizen
to be free in the enjoyment of all his facul-
ties. . . to live and work where he will .... it
In the next century the Supreme Court, in
considering the constitutionality of a state
tax on occupations, including persons en-
6 Exec. Order No. 7856, 22 C.F.R. §51.75 (1949).
7 See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451
(D.D.C. 1952).
8 MAGNA CARTA, c.42.
9 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *265.
10 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
11 165 U.S. 578, 589.(1896).
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gaged in hiring laborers to be employed be-
yond the state limits, was most emphatic in
its affirmance that the right of locomotion
is an attribute of personal liberty and a right
secured by the Constitution under the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment.12
More recently, the United Nations in its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights13
has recognized the right of international
travel.
Shachtman v. Dulles, supra, is one of a
series of recent cases which have raised the
question whether the right to travel is
protected by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The first case was Robe-
son v. Acheson.14 In that case, appellant's
passport had been invalidated by the State
Department on the somewhat vague grounds
that his travel abroad would be "contrary to
the best interests of the United States. 15 In
appealing from a District Court dismissal of
the complaint, Robeson charged that the
action of the State Department was violative
of due process. The appeal was dismissed
as moot since the appellant's passport had
previously expired. In Bauer v. AchesonI6
the court held that where the applicant was
denied a passport he was entitled to a hear-
ing by the State Department wherein his
passport rights might be determined. The
court said that the right to travel came under
the right to liberty in the Fifth Amendment
but failed to give any reason for the holding,
other than that the right was an "attribute
of personal liberty."17
The instant case is the third in this series
12 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
13 1948-49 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
536, art. 13 (1950).
14 198 F. 2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
15 Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 47, 61 (1956).
16 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
17 Id. at 451.
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of decisions and is the first case wherein the
right to travel is held to be protected by the
Fifth Amendment because it is a natural
right of man.18
The ratio decidendi of the instant case is
based on the court's determination that the
right to international travel is included in
the term "liberty" in the Fifth Amendment.
The reasons given for this are not clearly
explained.
First of all, the court says that denial of
a passport causes a deprivation of liberty
that a citizen otherwise would have. 19 This
liberty that a citizen would otherwise have
obviously does not mean the mere physical
ability to act, for then all of man's physical
actions would be included in the "liberty" of
the Fifth Amendment and a person might
invoke the due process clause whenever a
law prevented him from taking any such
action. Neither is the word liberty used in
the Hohfeldian sense of a mere absence of
a regulation of conduct by the command of
society,20 for the due process clause is only
applicable when a person's conduct is regu-
lated.
The real meaning of the court's expres-
sion is indicated by the statement that travel
should be included under "liberty" because
it is a "natural right."' 21 What was meant is
perhaps explained by the classical natural
law idea of natural rights:
His eternal goal, the salvation of his soul,
imparts to the person an ultimate transcen-
dence. Thence result certain natural rights
for the individual person in relation to the
state. These rights are not first conferred
IS See also Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218
(D.D.C. 1955).
'9 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F. 2d 938, 941 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
20 Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29
YALE L. J. 163 (1919).
21 See note 19 supra.
upon him by the positive law; they are at
most explicitly recognized by it. Thus it is
not in virtue of this recognition that such
rights have force; they are recognized be-
cause they are valid absolutely. 22
There are certain principles of classical
natural law which are obvious dictates of
man's rational nature; they are self-evident,
absolute and universal. The primary prin-
ciple may be stated as "What is good is to
be done, and what is evil is to be avoided. '23
The secondary principles of the natural law
are the immediate specifications of the pri-
mary principles and are expressed generally
in the Decalogue. 24 These principles are, in
effect, natural law duties, and the correla-
tives of these duties are natural rights. Thus:
Natural law does indeed imply the existence
of some human rights which are absolute
and inalienable, such as the right to life,
worship, marriage, property.., locomotion
... etc. These are absolute in the sense that
they derive from human nature; they are not
mere hand-outs from the state; the state is
bound to protect them and cannot destroy
them even though, by physical force the
state has sometimes prevented their exercise.
They are not absolute in the sense that they
are unlimited in scope. It is a commonplace
in classical natural law philosophy that hu-
man rights, even the most fundamental men-
tioned above, are limited. They are limited
in the sense that they are subject to specifi-
cation, qualification, expansion and contrac-
tion ... as the equal rights of others and the
demands of the common good from circum-
stance to circumstance, and from time to
time reasonably indicate.25
It seems clear that there are situations in
which the right to travel may not be denied at
all. For instance, a Jewish person in Nazi Ger-
many during World War II or a Hungarian
22 ROMMEN, NATURAL LAW 243 (1948).
23 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 263.
in Budapest under the present Communist
regime would have a natural right to leave
the country since if he stayed he would be
completely deprived of some of his funda-
mental natural rights, e.g., life, worship,
property. Pope Pius XII in His 1952 Christ-
mas Eve Address 26 said that when married
people wish to remain faithful to the immu-
table laws of life established by their Crea-
tor, or when, to safeguard this fidelity, they
seek to free themselves from the straits in
which they are bound by their own country,
and they find no other remedy except emi-
gration, their natural right to emigrate or
immigrate should not be annulled or im-
peded on the pretext of a common good
falsely understood or applied.
It is also clear that under certain circum-
stances a government may rightfully prevent
a person from traveling outside the country.
For example, an individual may wish to
leave his country, but if in leaving the coun-
try he would leave a family without any
means of support and the burden of support
would fall on the state, he might be pre-
vented from doing so. Or if an American
scientist entrusted with top atomic secrets
wished to travel to Russia and the govern-
ment had reason to believe that he might
divulge these secrets to persons hostile to
the government of the United States, then,
in the interest of national security, he might
rightfully be prevented from leaving.
In conclusion, the right to travel outside
the country may be included in the natural
right to locomotion. Whether or not a per-
son may be prevented by the government
from exercising the right depends on many
factors. The basis of the determination is a
reasonable relation between the wants and
rights of the individual and the rights of
26 45 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDI$ 33, 41-42 (1952).
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others and the common good within the
,scope of governmental protection.
The word "liberty" in the Constitution
strictly construed may not be so extensive
as to make the due process clause applicable
in every case in which a person is denied the
liberty or freedom of exercising a natural
right (for then there would be little reason
for including "life" and "property" in the
clause since these are also natural rights).
The word has, however, been construed to
include the right to locomotion 27 and inter-
national travel may be included in this right.
If the Constitution has recognized the
right to liberty as a principle of natural
law, 28 then it remains for the legislature and
the courts to apply this general principle to
specific cases, for it is accepted in Scholastic
Philosophy that ". . . as regards the general
principles ... truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all" and "the
natural law, as to general principles, is the
same for all." '29 However, in specific cases,
for many reasons, men are unable to deter-
mine what is to be inferred from general
principles.30 This is one of the functions of
positive law.3 1
The court in the instant case indicated
that the requirements of both procedural
and substantive due process must be met
27 Kenealy, supra note 23 at 263-64.
28 The "liberty" mentioned in the Constitution in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a very
general term but it is clear, from looking at the
Declaration of Independence, that it was thought
of as embracing the inherent rights in men be-
stowed upon them not by Acts of Congress, but
"by their Creator." See Butcher's Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (con-
curring opinion). The Due Process clause intended
to give political effect to this declaration of rights.
See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872).
29 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, q. 94, art. 4.
30 Id., I-II, q. 94, art. 2.
31 ROMMEN, NATURAL LAW 257 (1948).
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wherever the government restricts the exer-
cise of a right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.
Procedural due process requires that the
reasons for governmental restriction and the
arguments of the citizen affected thereby
must be made known at a hearing at which
the applicability of the general principles of
law to the facts of the specific case may be
determined. This requirement was fulfilled
in the instant case.
The court then added that even if a hear-
ing is had and a person is still denied a pass-
port, substantive due process requires that
the reason for said denial be not arbitrary.
In making this determination, it seems that
the court has advanced our governmental
system a little closer to the ideal in which
the relation between governments and the
natural rights of individuals may be properly
ascertained and balanced.
In none of the cases to date has it been
made clear on just what specific grounds a
passport may be denied. 32 But it is certain
that the right to travel and thus the right to
receive a passport is something of which
men may not be deprived lightly or without
sufficient reason consistent with the law of
the land embodied in the Constitution of the
United States.
32 The instant case said only that the mere fact
that a person was a member of an organization on
the Attorney General's list was not a basis for
denial of a passport. It seems improbable that the
problems of just what are sufficient grounds for
denial will remain unsolved in the very near future
since the present practice of the State Department
seems to be to issue a passport to anyone who
threatens court action. See Boudin, The Constitu-
tional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47, 61
(1956).
Segregation (continued)
premise of revealed religion. But, in conclu-
sion, allow me to add, in my capacity as a
Catholic priest, that there is no question
whatsoever as to the position of the Catholic
Church on the issue of compulsory
segregation.
The position of the Catholic Church has
been clearly and courageously stated by His
Excellency, the Archbishop of New Orleans.
The philosophy of the natural law has al-
ways been embraced and elevated by the
theology of the Church Universal. The fun-
damental principle of the essential equality
and dignity of every human being, and the
essential unity of the entire human race,
has been sanctified by the sacrifice of Cal-
vary, illumined by the dawn of Easter, em-
blazoned by the fires of Pentecost, and
heralded to the corners of the earth by
the voice of Catholicism - proclaiming our
common origin in the First Adam, our com-
mon redemption by the Second Adam, and
our common sanctification in the Mystical
Body of Christ. Popes, archbishops, bishops,
dogmatic and moral theologians, the unani-
mous judgment of the teaching Church is
that compulsory segregation is objectively
and morally wrong. It is a cancer in the body
politic. It is a desecration of Christian civili-
zation. We like to think that God is on the
side of our American way of life; but it is
true only to the extent that our American
way of life is on the side of Him Who said,
"1 am the way, the truth and the life." In the
eyes of God there is neither white nor black
nor red nor yellow nor brown; neither Jew
nor Gentile nor Barbarian nor Cythian; but
all are brothers in Christ Jesus.
